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Full Idea
Peirce takes bivalence not to be a law of logic, but a regulative assumption of enquiry.
Gist of Idea
Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic
Source
report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Cheryl Misak - Pragmatism and Deflationism 2 n10
Book Ref
'New Pragmatists', ed/tr. Misak,Cheryl [OUP 2009], p.75
A Reaction
I like this. For most enquiries it's either true or not true, it's either there or it's not there. When you aren't faced with these simple dichotomies (in history, or quantum mechanics) you can relax, and allow truth value gaps etc.
| 21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
| 19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
| 19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
| 19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
| 21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
| 10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
| 21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
| 16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
| 13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
| 19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |
| 21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |